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ABSTRACT 
Globalisation is a multidimensional phenomenon and should be conceptualised 
as a process rather than an outcome. Economic, political, cultural and societal 
elements are involved in the complex set of interactions we can-define as global-
isation. However, a key factor, which is frequently ignored is the importance of 
politics in shaping and guiding this process. For example economic liberalisa-
tion and deregulation, the form which economic globalisation has thus far taken, 
did not emerge from impersonal market and technological forces. Governments, 
especially those of the United States and Great Britain, followed explicit policies 
of currency controls relaxation, the reduction in trade barriers, and the retreat in 
the role of the state in the economy generally. Despite the power of the eco-
nomic forces thus released, politics remains a key potential player and giobalisa-
tion is not necessarily irreversible. Given the indeterminacy of the outcomes of 
giobalisation, four alternative theories of the future are presented and analysed. 
JELF 02 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation has since the early 1990s become one of the most frequently used 
concepts in the social sciences! and is a strong contender for the most commonly 
used term in the public debates. It is often used indiscriminately to describe al-
most all modem developments - good and bad - and thus usually generates 
more heat than light. Indeed social science methodology confirms that a concept 
that purports to explain everything in fact explains nothing. 
This threatens to be the fate of the concept of globalisation. Protestors represent-
ing a wide range of diverse views and operating from such geographically dis-
tant cities as Seattle and Genoa, mobilise against its alleged evils while bureau-
crats from the International Monetary Fund. World Trade Organisation, and 
World Bank are staunch in its defence. Because the concept is so rarely defined 
with care and rigour, it has tended to become a catch-all concept which is often 
used to express widespread discontent with modernity and its disruptions. Yet 
even before we begin the task of defining and analysing a complex and dynamic 
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concept, a moment's reflection should convince the rational observer that glob-
alisation, however defined, cannot be held responsible for the wide array of 
popular grievances attributed to it. For example, many environmentalists blame 
globalisation for the decay of the environment. However, given that systems of 
production are located in geographically defined states, it is the actions and inac-
tions of governments in states such as China, India and the United States that 
must shoulder the responsibilities for pollution. Globalisation has little if any-
thing to do with these realities. Similarly, the decline in the viability of small 
farms and village business centres is not a consequence of the forces of global-
isation, but reflects the economies of scale which favour large agribusiness and 
hypermarkets. 
What is globalisation? Or phrased differently, if concepts are neither true nor 
false in and of themselves, how best can we think about the complex range of 
changes which are subsumed by the ideas of the critics and supporters of "glob-
alisation?" Globalisation is clearly a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Econo-
mists tend to equate globalisation with the process of economic liberalisation 
and deregulation. The contemporary global market is in the process of tran-
scending the boundaries of the state system. If this process reaches its logical 
conclusion without major political interference, an economic system liberated 
from the restraints of political sovereignty will have been created. Empirically 
this would be measured by the growth in transnational capital flows, the liberali-
sation of trade and, arguably, by the emergence of large corporations controlled 
and managed free from the restraints of a particular nation. Transnational corpo-
rations would be owned and managed by a global constituency of shareholders 
and managers. 
For many sociologists, globalisation is viewed as the process, which is creating a 
global culture characterised by the dominance of the English language rational-
ism, materialism and individualism. Many political scientists tend to see global-
isation as the process that is carrying liberalism and democracy to universal vic-
tory. Some analysts maintain that this process is threatening the state system it-
self because its defining characteristic sovereignty is being undermined2• 
Two problems emerge from this brief discussion. First, it is clearly dangerous to 
divide a complex phenomenon into discrete disciplinary specialties. It has long 
been recognised, and bemoaned, that economists and political scientists have 
generally ignored each other's work even in areas where there are considerable 
overlaps. Secondly, globalisation must be conceptualised as a process and not as 
an outcome. While it should be possible to analyse empirically the determinants 
of globalisation, the outcomes are not path dependent and must thus be consid-
ered indeterminate. 
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What are the processes driving globalisation? Almost all scholars agree that 
technology, especially in the field of communications, is perhaps the most im-
portant influence on contemporary economic and political life. The world today 
is profoundly different from the past. Technology for example, has made possi-
ble actions, which enable vast magnitudes of funds to be transferred almost in-
stantaneously to any part of the world. Similarly, the ability of a global audience 
to have instantaneous access to information about political riots in the Middle 
East, the forcible confiscation of land in Zimbabwe, or the confusions around 
Americas recent presidential election, all have profound implications. 
How should we defme globalisation? It follows logically from the discussion 
above that globalisation, however defined, must be conceptualised as both a 
process and as a multidimensional phenomenon. Incorporating elements of An-
thony McGrew's defmition3, I would define globalisation as the processes, 
based upon technology, which increase both the speed and scope of linkages 
across state boundaries in areas including the economy, polity and culture. 
The implications of this defmition are profound and cannot be explored in detail 
here. But the following should be noted: 1) the process of globalisation need not 
be irreversible, 2) globalisation in one sphere may not be matched by similar 
dynamics in another, and 3) the processes of globalisation in the various spheres 
may, in fact, be in conflict with each other. In the remainder of this article, I will 
briefly examine some of the implications of these factors for the politics of 
globalisation in the context of the larger processes of change. 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
From a legal perspective, international politics is still based upon the West-
phaian legacy of independent and sovereign political states. Indeed, the most 
universalistic global institution, the United Nations, was established by sover-
eign states and its founding charter pays explicit tribute to sovereignty and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of its members. 
During the Cold War, this state oriented paradigm retained considerable rele-
vance. The world was locked in a titanic struggle between two superpowers, 
each with its associated vassals and allies. Despite the ideological pretensions of 
this struggle, there were also important geo-political and nationalistic elements. 
Indeed, many theorists argue that the distribution of power in an international 
system dictates the kind of configurations of conflict in that system 4 • The bipolar 
contest between 1945 and 1990 had several important characteristics. Firstly, 
economics was frequently subordinated to the political requirements of the con-
test. National interests, defined largely in terms of power, were paramount. 
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From a policy perspective, the distribution of gains (and losses) was more im-
portant than the absolute gains. The market was to a large extent subordinate to 
the polity. For example capital, was not permitted to seek freely its highest re-
turn, trade was guided in political directions; many products were not allowed to 
be exported to potential rivals while allies frequently received special prefer-
ences. Thus, the then Soviet Union subsidised the economies of allies such as 
Cuba and the German Democratic Republic both to bind them closely to the su-
perpower and to prevent internal dissent in the periphery. Similarly, France tried 
to protect its political influence in Francophone Africa through policies such as 
currency arrangements and preferential trading agreements. These political im-
peratives did not totally override the market except in the Soviet bloc. But even 
the western capitalist states limited the autonomy of the market to create and 
distribute economic values. 
A second important consequence of the Cold War was the dovmplaying of the 
importance of domestic factors in the choice of both allies and foes. Although 
the superpower conflict was ostensibly solely over ideological concerns, the re-
ality is that Realpolitik overrode ideology. For example, the United States, de-
spite its liberal and capitalist orientation, supported overtly and consistently a 
wide range of authoritarian regimes such as Chile and, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
South Africa, as well as several market unfriendly regimes in Africa and Latin 
America. The key to American support was not primarily the nature of a state's 
political economy but its foreign policy orientations. States that were avowedly 
anti-communistic were almost automatically assured of US support. Similarly 
the Soviet Union, despite its more explicit ideological self-image, supported a 
wide range of African and Asian states such as Ghana, Angola and Cambodia 
whose actual economic policies bore little resemblance to genuine socialism. 
A third implication of the end of superpower bipolarity has been the decline in 
the autonomy of many small states. During the Cold War, states such as Zambia 
had some scope for maneuver because they could playoff one superpower 
against the other. Given the importance then of bilateral aid, this could be a re-
warding strategy. The end of superpower competition has made such a strategy 
unviable with significant implications. For example, contemporary Zambia has 
international debts of about six billion dollars - about twice the size of its na-
tional income. It only survives on global handouts which constitute half the gov-
ernments budget. The world can now dictate the terms of its engagement with 
Zambia. In the past, Zambia would have retained some autonomy - under cold 
war conditions, President Chiluba would not have been forced to abide by the 
constitutional prohibition on seeking a third term. 
During the cold war the international system was structured around the principle 
of a balance of power which also largely served to ensure order. The so-called 
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universalistic organisations such as the United Nations had no independent ca-
pabilities and were essentially paralysed by the mutual veto enjoyed by its per-
manent members. Economic organisations such as the IMF and World Bank: 
were for western states only while the Soviet Union created its own exclusive 
organisations such as COMECON. 
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM 
When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, bipolarity ended with it. The 
world became characterised by the effective hegemony of the United States as 
the world's only superpower. However, in a world where many different types 
of power exist, the United States alone was not able to dominate all aspects of 
the global political agenda. But if the US could not dominate, it exercised veto 
power in most areas of public international policy. 
The attention of intellectuals turned to the new paradigm of "globalisation". 
Most observers, aware of both the growing complexity of the modem world and 
the inability of the remaining superpower to dominate the system in its entirety, 
sought a systemic explanation for this seeming paradox. The thesis that new 
forces led by the markets had emerged outside of political control seemed to 
provide a useful explanation. This is, however, a profoundly ahistorical perspec-
tive. Globalisation did not emerge ab initio from uncontrollable systemic forces. 
Political decisions with intended and unintended consequences made possible 
the spread oftechnology. Major powers, following their own perceived interests, 
set in motion policies of economic liberalisation. When the perceived political 
imperatives of a Marxist challenge began to decline, the major powers, espe-
cially the United States and Great Britain, liberated the market on a global scale. 
The process of trade liberalisation, which began with the formation of GAIT, 
continued with the inclusion of the former Soviet Union and most of its allies. 
Capital was largely liberated from regulations and controls - the result of delib-
erate government decisions, first in the United States and Great Britain and then 
spreading throughout the industrialised world. With the unimportant exceptions 
of a handful of states such as Cuba and Iraq, trade was largely liberated from po-
litical controls. 
IMPLICATIONS AND TRENDS 
In economic theory the consequences of economic liberalisation are unambigu-
ous and generally positive. A large literature, both theoretical and empirical ex-
ists describing the outcomes of economic integration, trade liberalisation and 
capital mobilitys. We have case-studies of the empirical outcomes in the United 
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States and increasingly the European Union. Unimpeded by political factors, 
economic globalisation will lead to the emergence of a global economy in which 
resources are allocated on the basis of efficiency rather than geography or poli-
tics. 
However, in the political sphere the implications of globalisation for both do-
mestic and global politics are problematic and probably indetenninate at this 
stage of History. Economic liberalisation has advanced far more rapidly than po-
litical integration. Although the scope of economic globalisation has been exag-
gerated6, we can nonetheless trace empirically an emerging global economy. 
However as noted earlier, the political system remains based, frequently ficti-
tiously, on the notion of sovereignty. 
Generally, the most important of the existing trends can be said to be: the dis-
continuities between economic globalisation and the state system; the rapid pace 
of technological change; the power and spread of Western ideas; and the tenta-
tive emergence ofa nascent global civil society. While all of these would require 
a rigorous analysis, this is not possible for the scope of this article. However, it 
may be useful to explore some of the possible outcomes of these forces. Given 
our conceptualisation of globalisation as a process, what are the possible politi-
cal outcomes? Broadly, we can distinguish between the following possibilities: 
the re-emergence of Realpolitik; the end of sovereignty; the return of the state, 
and/or global governance. 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF REALPOLITIK 
The end of the Cold War largely liberated the market from political controls. Al-
though many market optimists believe that this victory is irreversible (see be-
low), others argue that this victory is a delusion. The political kingdom is far too 
well entrenched in human society to be so easily vanquished. Conflict is en-
demic and will re-emerge sooner or later in one fonn or another. 
One of the most prominent advocates of this position is Samuel Huntington? He 
argues that globalisation is bringing Western ideas to all parts of the globe while 
economic integration is penetrating many non-Western societies. Contrary to the 
view of the optimists, growing contacts will lead not to harmony and a shared 
materialism but to increased conflict and turbulence. The conflicts will not be 
based upon traditional state conflicts or ideologies but upon a clash of civilisa-
tions. In Huntington's view, "the most important conflicts of the future will oc-
cur along the fault lines separating these civilisations from another"s. 
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Other pessimists reject the Huntington analysis but agree that conflict cannot be 
eliminated from global affairs. They maintain that states will remain the key 
players in the future and that the present harmony which characterises relations 
between the major powers will be temporary. In the view of nea-realists it will 
be systemic forces, which lead "states [to] balance against hegemons,,9. The pre-
sent dominance of the United States will in time produce an inevitable counter-
vailing force. One possibility would be for a politically united Europe to chal-
lenge US hegemony. More destabilising for political stability would be the 
emergence of new and revisionist superpowers like China and India which 
would be unlikely to accept a world created in Western, and especially, Ameri-
can images. And the former superpower represented by contemporary Russia 
could, in time, become an important revisionist power. Recent negotiations be-
tween China and Russia to establish the Shanghai Five might be seen as the be-
ginning of such a process. 
THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The high priests of economic globalisation like OhmaelO and Friedman believe 
that the conflict between the state and the market is already largely over and the 
market has emerged victorious! The imperatives of economic liberaIisation have 
overcome the reactionary forces represented by the state. Grand ideologies and 
petty but destructive nationalisms are largely dead. Where they do still exist - in 
Bosnia, China and Nigeria - they are restricted to backward societies, which 
represent the past rather than the future. 
In all of today's advanced and dynamic societies - in North America, Western 
Europe, Australia and Japan - governments have rejected the destructive nation-
alisms of the past while the populace has rejected the grand designs of the state. 
People there seek personal fulfillment and improved material welfare. And they 
will use their vote to punish any political movement, which seeks to return to the 
past. In the words of then American presidential candidate Bill Clinton, "its the 
economy stupid!" 
In addition, the costs of attempting to unravel the threads of today's economic 
liberalisation would be too high for any rational government to even consider. 
Power now lies squarely with the giant corporations, which control the world's 
major accumulations of capital and dominate the creation and dissemination of 
technology and intellectual capital. Even formerly radical states in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America are competing fiercely with each other to become integrated 
into the global economy. 
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THE RETURN OF THE STATE 
Neo-realists reject both the return to conflict paradigms and these economically 
deterministic conclusions. They believe that the extent of globalisation has been 
grossly exaggerated. The state remains a key player - especially the United 
States. The state economy remains far more important than the global economy. 
Thus, they reject the claim that transnational corporations are becoming domi-
nant players. Indeed they reject the basic concept of a transnational company. 
Corporations may have global operations but they remain state based: they oper-
ate from geographically defined headquarters, they are legal creations of particu-
lar jurisdictions, and states remain the dominant authority in regulatory and tax 
policies II. Indeed the policies of states towards private enterprise, property 
rights and education remain a vital element in the prospects for success or fail-
ure of the corporate sectorl2 • Politics thus remains in control- at least in the ma-
jor states. If countries like Peru, Thailand, Ghana and Namibia lack genuine 
autonomy, this is not the consequence of globalisation. Historically, minor pow-
ers have never had real power in a world dominated by the consequences of the 
inequalities in the distribution of power. Globalisation is not an explanation for 
powerlessness but a conceptual confusion resulting from an ahistorical mode of 
analysis. 
Above all, neo-realists see the contemporary world as in large part the creation 
of the major players, especially the United States and Great Britain. To put it in 
the words of Susan Strange, these major powers had "structural power", i.e., 
''the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks 
within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises" 13 • With the end of the cold war they perceived that their interests, 
and those of their citizens, would be served by a liberal economic order. If eco-
nomic liberalisation is the result of political decisions, then it can in principle be 
controlled. No mainstream scholar has advocated a return to autarchy. However 
they reject the argument that globalisation is the outcome of systemic forces 
which can be neither controlled nor reversed. Globalisation remains in the inter-
ests of the superpowers and their domestic elite. And should these interests 
change, states acting singly and collectively would have both the power and the 
will to reassert political control over the market. 
GOVERNANCE 
The fmal perspective is more complex and nuanced than any of the preceding 
approaches. The governance perspective accepts the important role that the state 
has to play in resolving conflicts, providing public goods including security, and 
regulating an increasingly complex society and environment. Proponents of the 
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governance perspective argue that although the state is not obsolete, it cannot 
continue with business as usual in a complex and interdependent context. The 
key global players have transcended conflicts of the past - be they based upon 
state, culture or ideology. However it is utopian to expect a global system of 
government to emerge under present circumstances. They also reject the hyper-
globalist argument of the victory of the market, which implies that politics is of 
very limited importance. However, despite the absence of a global government 
or system of authority, the global community is not in chaos. The functions of 
government can be performed even in the absence of government. A system is 
emerging in which a complex web of institutions and groups is performing some 
of the functions of government. Contemporary global organisations like the 
WTO have far more actual authority than an earlier generation of institutions 
like the UN system and the World Bank because it is not legally dominated by 
any power. And unlike the UN and, de facto, the JMF and World Bank, the 
WTO does not have a veto mechanism. 
New global institutions, despite their fragility, are increasing and are being 
complemented by regimes - systems of rules and norms, which sovereign states 
are increasingly accepting voluntarilyl4. Self-interest does not have to produce a 
Hobbesian world of conflict and anarchy. Rational actors can learn from experi-
ence how to cooperate with other independent players. Although this emerging 
system is not directly democratic, it is being supported by a range of NGOs, 
which now constitute the beginnings of a global civil society. Ecologists, human 
rights activists and others concerned with global issues are using modern tech-
nology to cooperate across state boundaries. A new political dynamic is devel-
oping - not as a replacement for states and governments but as democratising 
and supplementing forces. 
Governance without government is epitomised by the emergence of tribunals for 
justice. Despite the admonition against interference in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign states, a global sense of community is slowly emerging. The arrest of 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in Britain at the request of a Spanish 
prosecutor was a harbinger of this development This trend has accelerated with 
the arrest and prosecution of former Yugoslav leaders including Milosevic. This 
new direction in global affairs is now becoming formally instutionalised. In 
1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia was established and in the following 
year a similar body was established for Rwanda. Both bodies were created under 
the auspices of the Security Council. A more ambitious development is the pro-
posed International Criminal Court also under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. Thus far, thirty six of the sixty states required for its establishment have 
ratified the proposaL If it is established it will represent a major advance in giv-
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ing meaning, through possible retribution, to the commitment to the protection 
of global human rights. 
DISCUSSION 
It has been a central contention of this article that the future has not yet been ir-
revocably written. Unlike advocates of a "return to history" or "Sovereignty-at-
bay", I believe that various outcomes remain possible. 
The key weakness of theories, which predict the re-emergence of Realpolitik, is 
that they are trapped in a view of history where peoples and states are caught in 
a world of conflict. Despite the publicity accorded to Huntington's "clash of 
civilizations", few conflicts today are exclusively or even primarily about cul-
ture, however defined. Similarly, although it is possible that revisionist states 
like China may emerge to challenge the status quo, it is not inevitable that this 
will happen. And thus far no state has advocated a global system fundamentally 
different from the contemporary world. Rather than transformation, critics are 
demanding fairness - in the composition of the Security Council, in voting 
weights in the IMF, and in general for greater democracy and transparency. 
Similarly, proponents of the view that markets have or will override the polity 
have a simplistic and deterministic view of causation in human societies. A cen-
tral theme of this article has been the political dynamic behind economic liber-
alisation. And what the polity has created, it can also destroy. 
Many useful insights are contained in the works of the advocates of a "return of 
the state" and "global governance". Politics, domestically and globally, remains 
dominant. Power politics has not been eliminated. However, the world has 
changed dramatically and it is not business as usual in global politics. New is-
sues have arisen - ecology for example - while sovereignty takes a different 
form in a world of interdependencies and hyper-complexity. Technology makes 
cooperation between individuals and groups and organisations possible in a way 
that was unthinkable in the past. 
The future will look both similar to and different from our recent past. There 
will be continuities and discontinuities. States will continue to be the principal 
actors but they will share the stage with NGOs, regional bodies and global or-
ganisations. Power and security will continue to be central issues but they will 
be joined by issues of human rights, the protection of the environment, and the 
pursuit of justice. The past, present and future will be joined simultaneously! 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The end of the Cold War then, has witnessed the general decline in the impor-
tance of explicitly political factors in the formulation and implementation of 
economic policy, the rise in the importance of economic values and thus the in-
creased importance in the role of the market in shaping resource allocation and 
distribution decisions. One major, consequent problem has been the growing 
imbalance between the market and the polity. While economic forces have been 
largely liberated from state regulation, no global mechanism has been created to 
perform the traditional functions of governance. This problem is most urgent in 
the area of capital flows. In a single polity with a common currency, the move-
ment of capital has limited political relevance. However, in a world in which 
states remain the organisational framework, the free movement of capital can 
have profoundly destabilising consequences. This is compounded by the relative 
immobility of labour. Historically, mass migrations have been a powerful redis-
tributive force which have dramatically contributed to the reduction in inequali-
ties between states. 
The implications for economic stability and macroeconomic policy of the imbal-
ance between political and economic globalisation fall outside the scope of this 
article. But in the sphere of hot money, i.e., the billions of dollars floating 
through the system derived from drugs and other criminal activities, the lack of a 
global authority or regulatory mechanism has important consequences for the 
conduct of political life. More generally, the problem lies in the failure of states 
to develop a mechanism for global political governance. The decline in eco-
nomic autarchy has taken place in the context of sovereign states who are reluc-
tant to cede any of their legal authority. None of the so-called international or-
ganisations are genuinely international. From the United Nations system to the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation they remain 
state-based. The world's only superpower dominates this system and few, if any, 
significant decisions can be made without US support. It should be stressed that 
this problem has not been created by globalisation. For most states, historically 
and up to the present, the idea of equality and autonomy has always been a 
myth. The major powers in all systems, from the seventeenth century to the pre-
sent, have been dominant. If the superpowers have always made history, the mi-
nor powers have had to adjust to that reality. Globalisation has simply made this 
reality more stark. 
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